Bistable Perception Modeled as Competing Stochastic Integrations at Two Levels by Gigante, Guido et al.
Bistable Perception Modeled as Competing Stochastic
Integrations at Two Levels
Guido Gigante
1,2*, Maurizio Mattia
2,3, Jochen Braun
4, Paolo Del Giudice
2,3
1Wolf Soluzioni, Rome, Italy, 2Istituto Superiore di Sanita `, Rome, Italy, 3INFN, Sezione Roma 1, Rome, Italy, 4University of Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany
Abstract
We propose a novel explanation for bistable perception, namely, the collective dynamics of multiple neural populations that
are individually meta-stable. Distributed representations of sensory input and of perceptual state build gradually through
noise-driven transitions in these populations, until the competition between alternative representations is resolved by a
threshold mechanism. The perpetual repetition of this collective race to threshold renders perception bistable. This
collective dynamics – which is largely uncoupled from the time-scales that govern individual populations or neurons –
explains many hitherto puzzling observations about bistable perception: the wide range of mean alternation rates exhibited
by bistable phenomena, the consistent variability of successive dominance periods, and the stabilizing effect of past
perceptual states. It also predicts a number of previously unsuspected relationships between observable quantities
characterizing bistable perception. We conclude that bistable perception reflects the collective nature of neural decision
making rather than properties of individual populations or neurons.
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Introduction
Certain visual displays are not perceived in a stable way but,
from time to time and seemingly spontaneously, their phenomenal
appearance wavers and settles in a distinctly different form. This
phenomenon is called bistable perception and occurs with a
variety of ambiguous visual displays (e.g., [1]), as well as with
ambiguous stimuli in the auditory (e.g., [2]) and tactile domains [3].
The most extensively studied instance is binocular rivalry [4–7],
where the phenomenal experience of an observer alternates
between two images that are continuously presented to the left and
right eye, respectively. In spite of the somewhat ‘unnatural’
method of stimulus delivery, there is good evidence that binocular
rivalry shares the typical properties of other instances of bistable
perception [8–11].
One typical property of bistable perception is that phenomenal
appearance shifts irregularly, so that a particular appearance lasts
for varying lengths of time. The average such ‘‘dominance time’’
varies by one or two orders of magnitude (typically seconds to tens
of seconds) between individual observers [12,13] and between
different bistable displays [10,11,14,15]. Even for the same
observer and same display, dominance times vary substantially
with stimulus intensity [16,17], with attention [18–21], and when a
display is periodically interrupted [22–24]. In some cases, the
average dominance time experienced by a given observer on a
given display under different stimulus regimes may differ by two
orders of magnitude [21].
Another typical property is that the statistical distribution of
dominance times is well approximated by a Gamma function
[14,25,26]. In general, the shape parameter r of the Gamma
function falls into a surprisingly narrow range with values from 3
to 6 [25–30], although values from 2 to 20 have also been reported
(e.g., [31]).
Whereas bistable perception was long considered a ‘‘memory-
less’’ process [25,27,28,31], it has become clear that phenomenal
appearance can be influenced by past perceptual states. For
example, when the presentation of an ambiguous display is
interrupted and later resumed, the dominant appearance often
remains the same [22–24]. This persistence of the dominant
appearance stabilizes perception considerably, slowing or even
arresting perceptual reversals for intermittently presented displays.
The ‘memory’ in question reflects a longer history of dominance
periods, not merely the last dominance period before the stimulus
interruption [32,33].
It is not known what mechanisms allow a ‘memory’ of
perceptual appearance to persist and to influence the appearance
of subsequent stimulation. One possibility are adaptation states at
the level of perceptual representations, as such states are known to
persist over short stimulation gaps and to influence subsequent
appearance [32,34,35]. Another possible mechanism would be
some kind of short-term or working memory at post-perceptual
levels of processing [24,36]. Qualitatively, the effect of ‘memory’
can be summarized as follows: the longer an appearance has
dominated perception in the recent past, the more likely it is to
dominate perception again. The effect of ‘memory’ is evident for
continuous and, more markedly, intermittent stimulation, and
appears to be comparatively long-lasting (i.e., minutes rather than
seconds [33,37]).
We propose a model for the dynamics of bistable perception
with two novel elements: (i) stochastic integration over multiple
meta-stable populations and (ii) two separate levels of represen-
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central intuition is that perceptual bistability reflects the collective
properties of many meta-stable populations rather than specific
biophysical properties of single neurons (see also [38]). Together,
these two elements account for several hitherto puzzling aspects of
bistable perception, including the wide range of time-scales of
perceptual alternations, the existence and characteristics of
memory effects, the highly conserved shape of dominance
distributions, and others. Our model predicts the perceptual
dynamics of bistable displays for a variety of stimulation regimes,
including continuous and intermittent presentation. Although
formulated at the level of abstract populations, our model could
readily be extended to a biophysically detailed description of
spiking neurons. As our model aims to account for comparatively
slow processes (O(10 s)), it neglects phenomena such as fast
adaptation.
Several computational accounts for binocular rivalry have been
proposed previously. All postulate some form of reciprocal
inhibition between two rivaling representations [39–43]. Some
recent models are biophysically more realistic and are formulated
in terms of spiking neurons. In addition to mutual inhibition, these
models postulate some form of fast adaptation for the currently
dominant population (in the firing rate, the synaptic efficacy, or
both), which curtails dominance times and enforces perceptual
reversals [44–46]. In yet other models, the effect of adaptation is
complemented by noise-driven transitions [17,47–49]. Some
recent models have introduced an additional form of slow
adaptation in order to account for memory effects [32,34,35].
Finally, to accommodate experimental evidence that several
neural levels contribute to binocular rivalry, two recent models
[45,50] postulate a feedforward hierarchy of competing levels.
Models
Our model is stochastic and follows the activity of many
independent neural populations. Each population is assumed to
possess two stable states - an ‘inactive’ state of low activity and an
‘active’ state of high activity - and to transition back and forth
between these states under the influence of input and noise.
Transitions are assumed to occur with certain rates (probabilities
per unit time), which in turn will be seen to depend on visual input
and on the phenomenal percept.
The model postulates two representational levels, one level of
‘evidence populations’ (EPs), which integrate visual inputs over
short time-scales, and another level of ‘memory populations’
(MPs), which integrate phenomenal states over longer time-scales.
To model the dynamics of binocular rivalry, where there are two
possible phenomenal states, we assume two pools of EPs (each with
NEP populations) and two pools of MPs (each with NMP
populations), associating each pool with a different phenomenal
state. The four pools and their interactions are shown schemat-
ically in Figure 1.
For a pool X (X~EP, MP) with NX populations, PX(n,t)
denotes the probability that n populations are ‘active’ at time t,
while the NX{n remaining populations are ‘inactive’. Further, nX
z
denotes the rate of the inactiveRactive transition and nX
{ that of
the activeRinactive transition. We assume that, in the time
interval dt, at most one transition can occur, independently of any
previous transitions (Poisson process).
Several transition events contribute to the total change dPX(n,t)
over dt. Negative contributions are occasioned by one of n active
populations becoming inactive nn{dtP(n,t) ½  , or by one of NX{n
inactive populations becoming active (NX{n)nzdtP(n,t) ½  .
Positive contributions arise from one of nz1 active populations
becoming inactive (nz1)n{dtP(nz1,t) ½  , or from one of
NX{nz1 inactive populations becoming active (NX{nz1)nz ½
dtP(n{1,t) 
All four contributions enter into the dynamic equation of pool
X:
d
dt
PX(n,t)~(NX{nz1)nX,c
z PX(n{1,t)z(nz1)nX,c
{ PX(nz1,t)
{½(NX{n)nX,c
z znnX,c
{  PX(n,t)
ð1Þ
Here, the superscript X denotes the four pools (evidence and
memory populations for two percepts) and the superscript c indicates
different transition rates (see below). As long as transition rates remain
unchanged, the average number of active populations in a generic pool
approaches the asymptotic value n?~NXnz=(nzzn{) with a
characteristic time t~1=(nzzn{).T h easymptotic number of active
populations is a binomially distributed random variable:
PX
?(n)~
NX
n

nz
nzzn{
 n n{
nzzn{
 NX{n
ð2Þ
The phenomenal state ( i.e., the currently dominant percept) is
not represented explicitly in the model. Instead, the EPs and MP s
associated with each percept are combined and their total number
is compared with a threshold h. Whenever this number comes to
exceed the threshold and the stimulus is on, the associated percept
is deemed to gain dominance (even when the other percept’s total
activity also exceeds h at this moment of time). Once gained,
dominance is lost only when a percept’s total activity drops below
threshold, or when the total activity of the other percept crosses
the threshold, too.
An essential aspect of the model is the choice of transition rates.
We use transition rates to compactly represent the combined
Author Summary
The instability of perception is one of the oldest puzzles in
neuroscience. When visual stimulation is even slightly
ambiguous, perceptual experience fails to stabilize and
alternates perpetually between distinct states. The details
of this ‘bistable perception’ have been studied extensively
for decades. Here we propose that bistable perception
reflects the stochastic integration over many meta-stable
populations at two levels of neural representation. While
previous accounts of bistable perception rely on an
oscillatory dynamic, our model is inherently stochastic.
We argue that a fluctuation-driven process accounts
naturally for key characteristics of bistable perception that
have remained puzzling for decades. For example, our
model is the first to explain why the statistical variability of
successive dominance periods remains essentially the
same, while the mean alternation rates of bistable
phenomena range over two orders of magnitude. By
postulating two levels of representation that are driven by
stimulation and by perceptual state, respectively, our
model further accounts for the stabilizing influence of past
perceptual states, which are particularly evident in
intermittent displays. In general, a fluctuation-driven
process decouples the collective dynamics of bistable
perception from single-neuron properties and predicts a
number of hitherto unsuspected relations between
behaviorally observable measures.
Two Levels Bistable Perception Model
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input, and of the phenomenal percept. In developing the model,
we realized that a handful of conditions, each with different
transition rates, suffices to generate the rich dynamical behavior of
bistable perception. Specifically, we assume an ‘excitation’ of EPs
by the stimulus, an additional, ‘selective excitation’ of EPs and
MPs associated with the active percept, and a ‘selective inhibition’
of EPs associated with the other percept.
Figure 2 illustrates the typical evolution of activity in the
different pools, and the resulting perceptual alternations, when a
bistable stimulus is periodically interrupted by blank periods.
The dynamic evolution distinguishes 4 conditions, depending on
t h ep r e s e n c eo ra b s e n c eo fas t i m u l u sa n dad o m i n a n tp e r c e p t u a l
state:
Condition 1: After stimulus onset, but before a dominant
percept has emerged. When a stimulus is present, but no dominant
percept has yet emerged, the activity of EPs grows rapidly,
mimicking ‘excitation’ by the visual stimulus (n?~15, t~50ms).
Any activity of MP s decays (t~5s).
Condition 2: The first 200 ms after one percept (e.g., the
‘butterfly’) has gained dominance. When one percept becomes
dominant (because the combined activity of its associated
populations exceeds threshold), the now dominant EPs continue
to charge, but with longer characteristic times (n?~25, t~1:5s),
whereas the now suppressed EPs discharge (t~50ms). This short-
lasting condition stabilizes the newly dominant percept and
mimics a ‘transient suppression’ of the EPs associated with the
other percept. In effect, this cross-inhibition implements a
transient interaction between the active percept and the EPs
associated with the other percept. Note that dominance is gained
always by the most recent percept to cross h. The rapid sequence
corresponding to Condition 1 and Condition 2 explains the
‘spikes’ that are sometimes observed (in Figure 2) when stimulation
resumes at the end of a blank period.
Condition 3: Continued dominance of the same percept. After
the brief transition period, the EPs of the dominant percept
continue to charge as before, but the EPs of the suppressed percept
are now charging as well, albeit more slowly (n?~22, t~4s).
This condition mimics the combined effects of a ‘sustained
inhibition’ by the phenomenal percept and an ‘excitation’ by the
visual stimulus (see (1) above).
In addition to inhibiting EPs, the phenomenal state also excites
MPs. Specifically, we assume that the MP s associated with the
dominant percept charge slowly, (n?~13, t~5s), whereas the
MP s associated with the suppressed percept discharge at the same
rate. This ensures that the phenomenally dominant percept
charges its associated memory while discharging the memory of
the alternative percept.
Condition 29: The first 200 ms after a reversal, in which the
other percept (e.g., the ‘tree’) has gained dominance. This
condition is symmetric to Condition 2.
Condition 39: Continued dominance of the ‘tree’ percept
(symmetric to Condition 3).
Condition 4: Blank display. In the absence of a stimulus, any
residual activity dissipates and both EPs and MPs become inactive
(t~1s and t~300s, respectively). The rates for MP s are
characteristic times for the spontaneous decay of a percept-specific
working-memory.
Figure 1. Model architecture for binocular rivalry between two images (‘tree’ and ‘butterfly’). Two types of meta-stable populations –
evidence populations (EPs) and memory populations (MPs) – transition independently between ‘inactive’ and ‘active’ states. The evolution of activity
in each pool is governed by transition rates. Each percept is associated with one pool of EPs and another pool of MPs. Perceptual dominance
depends on the combined activity of the associated EPs and MPs. The colored arrows represent ‘effective’ interactions (excitatory, red; inhibitory,
blue) that modulate transition rates. The interdependence of transition rates and combined activity produces periodic reversals of phenomenal
experience.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000430.g001
Two Levels Bistable Perception Model
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integration parameters for MPs, pool sizes NEP and NMP) suffice
to emulate a large body of empirical observations on the
perceptual dynamics of continuous and intermittent displays.
Moreover, the predicted behavior is robust over a considerable
range of parameter values.
The interaction between total activity in EPs plus MPs and
transition rates in EPs and MP s, combined with the stochastic
activity dynamics in the four pools, produces an irregular sequence
of phenomenal reversals that may be compared directly to
experimental observations.
Results
Mean dominance times
The main evidence for a memory in bistable perception is the
tendency of a percept to persist when stimulation is interrupted:
before and after an interruption of stimulation, the subjective
appearances are often the same. This persistence slows and
perhaps even arrests perceptual reversals in intermittently
presented displays [22–24,51]. In our model, the persistence of
appearance arises from the existence of memory populations that
influence perceptual dominance.
We define the dominance time Tdom of a percept as the total
stimulated time between two reversals. In the case of continuous
stimulation, this is simply the time between reversals. In the case of
intermittent stimulation, it is the total time minus any blank
periods.
Our model predicts a complex dependence of the mean
dominance time STdomT on the stimulation period Ton and the
blank period Toff (Figure 3A). Starting from Ton~? (continuous
display), STdomT rises slowly from the baseline STcontinuous
dom T~4:5s
(dashed black lines), the increase becoming dramatic in the
proximity of Ton~STcontinuous
dom T. At this point, MP s are maximally
active and stabilize phenomenal experience. If perceptual reversals
occur at all, they happen at the beginning of, rather than during
Ton. For even smaller Ton, phenomenal experience remains stable
for a certain number of display cycles (see Perceptual
persistence), and STdomT decreases trivially with Ton. The
height and position of the peak in STdomT depends also on Toff,
for the average activity of MP s (and, thus, their stabilizing effect)
depends on the balance between Ton and Toff.
These predictions account qualitatively for the observation that
intermittent stimulation slows perceptual reversals [22–24].
Especially for short Ton, it is known that dominance times grow
very long and that perceptual reversals essentially cease [23].
Unsurprisingly, our model fails to predict the behaviour observed
for short Toff (,1 s) [52], which is thought to reflect fast
adaptation.
Raising stimulus intensity (i.e., luminance and/or color contrast)
can be assumed to monotonically increase the parameter n?.
When left- and right-eye images present different intensities, the
evidence populations associated with the left- and right-image EPs
will exhibit different parameter values, nLeft
? and nRight
? , respec-
tively.
It is interesting to explore how different choices of nLeft
? and
nRight
? affect the perception of a continuous display. When
(say) nRight
? is increased while nLeft
? is held constant, dominance
times increase slightly for the right image but decrease dramatically
for the left image (Figure 3B). When nLeft
? is decreased, the
intersection in Figure 3B shifts to the left (not shown), as reported by
[17]. This confirms that n? is a plausible substitute for stimulus
intensity.
The qualitative behavior in Figure 3B is empirically well
established and is known as ‘‘Levelt’s second proposition’’ [5,17].
The reason for this behavior is that, in our model, reversals are
triggered by the charging of the suppressed percept. As charging
rate increases with stimulus intensity (n?), greater stimulation of
the suppressed percept shortens STdomT for the dominant percept.
Distribution of dominance times
Dominance times of both human and non-human observers in
binocular rivalry and other types of bistable displays exhibit a
Gamma-like distribution G(t)~tr{1l
re{lt=C(r), where l is a rate
Figure 2. Activity dynamics during the intermittent presentation of a rivalrous display. The three graphs represent the evolution of EP
activity (upper), MP activity (middle), and combined activity (lower). In each graph, the activities associated with the two percepts are shown as
magenta and cyan curves, respectively. When the combined activity of one percept crosses a threshold (black line in the bottom graph), that percept
dominates phenomenal experience (as indicated at the top of each graph by magenta or cyan stripes). Stimulation periods of 4.4 s (grey stripes)
alternate with blank periods of 5.7 s. See text for a detailed description of the model dynamics.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000430.g002
Two Levels Bistable Perception Model
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STdomT~r=l and the coefficient of variation of dominance times
is CV~r{1=2. Empirically, rate l and mean time STdomT range
over almost two OM, whereas the shape parameter r is largely
preserved and varies only by half an OM [30,31]. One important
aim of our model is to account for this uncoupling of the shape
parameter r from the mean time STdomT.
In our model, perceptual reversals reflect the rapid accumulation
of stimulus evidence below the perceptual threshold by evidence
populations (EPs). Only three parameters matter for the distribution
of dominance times, namely, the total number of evidence
populations, NEP, the number of active evidence populations at
equilibrium, n?, relative to the perceptual threshold h, and the
relaxation time t. Of these three, the parameter n?, which
represents stimulus intensity, proves the most consequential.
For continuous displays, our model replicates a Gamma-like
distribution of dominance times for a wide range of parameter
choices (see inset in Figure 4). Intuitively, this may be understood
as follows: if n?&h,E P +MP crosses the threshold almost
deterministically, resulting in a Gaussian distribution of domi-
nance times (r&1). On the other hand, if n?%h,E P +MP will
cross the threshold only in the event of rare fluctuations, producing
an exponential distribution of dominance times (r^1). Interme-
diate situations with n?^h, lead to Gamma-like distributions with
r ranging from 3 to 6.
For example, in Figure 3B, the shape parameter r varies in a
comparatively narrow range (see inset), whilst the ratio of STdomT
s varies over almost two orders of magnitude. Note that the ‘left’
values of r and STdomT exhibit strongly opposing trends. This
marked anti-correlation is a sign of the stochastic mechanism for
threshold crossing: with lower stimulus intensity n?, threshold
crossings become rarer and the interval distribution becomes more
Poisson-like.
Note also the (slight) positive correlation between the ‘right’
values of r and STdomT in the inset of Figure 3B (red curve). This
constitutes a prediction that depends strictly on memory effects
and that goes beyond ‘‘Levelt’s second proposition’’ [5]. To
understand this positive correlation, consider a situation where
integration is driven by fluctuations and times-to-threshold are
comparatively long and exhibit Poisson-like statistics (r*1). In this
situation, the shape parameter r reflects the number of Poisson-like
‘jumps’ that are required to reach threshold h. The primary
consequences of an increase in nRight
? {h are that ‘left’ dominance
times decrease sharply while ‘right’ dominance times increase
slightly. As a secondary consequence, the ‘left’ memory activity
also decreases, which raises the number of ‘jumps’ required by the
‘left’ integration and thus also the ‘right’ value of r. This accounts
for the parallel trends in the ‘right’ values of r and STdomT.
In general, when the stimulus intensity n? is varied either in one
eye or in both, our model makes a qualitative prediction for the
average dominance distribution (comprising dominance times of
both percepts): the average values of r and STdomT should be anti-
Figure 3. Mean dominance times under interrupted and
continuous stimulation. A: Mean dominance times STdomT as a
function of stimulus period Ton, for different blank periods Toff. B:
Effect of differential stimulus intensity. Dominance times ST
Right
dom T and
STLeft
domT as a function of nRight
? , when nLeft
? is held constant. The inset
shows the corresponding shape parameters rLeft and rRight as a function
of nRight
? .
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000430.g003
Figure 4. Distribution of Tdom for intermittent display with
Ton~5s, Toff~5s, and STdomT~12:9s. Darker bins in the background:
integral probability of a perceptual switch between the nth and the
(nz1)th Ton; for nw2, the histogram is well approximated by an
exponential (continuous line: best exponential fit for nw2). Inset:
distribution of Tdom for continuous display. Blue bars: histogram of
Tdom from simulations (STdomT~4:8s), red line: fitted Gamma-
distribution, with STdomT~4:7sand r~3:1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000430.g004
Two Levels Bistable Perception Model
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a trend [31].
For intermittent displays (Figure 4, Ton~5s, Toff~5s), our
model predicts a multi-peaked distribution: the integral probability
of a perceptual switch between the nth and the (nz1)th Ton
(darker bins in the background), for nw2, is well approximated by
an exponential (continuous line: best exponential fit for nw2). The
spikes in the distribution reflect the periodicity of the stimulation
and are separated roughly by Ton. They comprise the probability
of a perceptual switch at the onset and during continued
presentation. Assuming that the MPs of the current winning
percept have reached a stationary state, both these probabilities do
not vary statistically from one Ton to the next, leading to an
exponential decay for large enough Tdom (nw2, or twice the
characteristic time of MPs). During the first two Ton, the MP s are
still charging after the last perceptual switch and a perceptual
reversal is more likely than for nw2. The first anomalous peak in
the distribution is attributable to the very brief dominance
intervals that usually occur during periods of ‘uncertainty’, when
the level of the MP s is roughly equal for both percepts (see the
central part of Figure 2 for an illustration).
There are few empirical reports of dominance distributions for
intermittent displays. Both Gamma-shaped [37] and monotonically
decreasing [51] distributions have been reported. However, further
experiments are needed to establish the generality of these results
Sequential correlations
Successive dominance intervals in bistable perception are
thought to be statistically almost independent [25,26]. This is
why bistable perception was long considered a ‘‘memoryless’’
process [25,27,28,31].
However, the existence of memory representations predicts
small but significant departures from sequential independence.
Figure 5A shows the predicted correlation between a given
dominance period and its n-th successor. Interestingly, the
predictions differ for continuous and intermittent presentation.
Figure 5B shows the correlation (c1) between successive
dominance periods of percept ‘Left’ (blue) and percept ‘Right’
(red), for continuous presentations, as functions of nRight
? (same
simulations as in Figure 3B).
The non–monotonic behaviour observed is another conse-
quence of MP dynamics. When one of the STdomT is much larger
than the characteristic times of MP s (left part of the plot), the
activity level of MP s is essentially constant (either low or high) and
cannot provide correlation effects; if the average STdomT is much
smaller than the characteristic times of MP s, memory effects do
not have time to build up and again cannot sustain correlations
(right part of the plot). Finally, whenever the distribution of
dominance times becomes narrow (high r values), so that the
variance is inherently small, sequential correlations will be
negligible.
Taken together, Figure 3B and Figure 5B suggest that an
experimental verification of Levelt’s second proposition should
reveal specific links between r, c1 and STdomT that result, at
bottom, from memory effects.
For continuous displays, correlations are largest for intermediate
values of stimulus intensity, when MP s charge partially and the
degree of charging varies from time to time (Figure 5B).
The peak position reflects the characteristic times of the MP s
(about 5 s). For other values of STdomT, the charging is either to
little or too complete to produce large correlations.
Memory-induced correlations should be somewhat larger in
intermittent displays, as the normal alternation of dominant
percepts is suspended and the same percept dominates for several
successive display intervals. In this situation, the differential
activity between the MP s of dominant and suppressed percepts
grows larger and stochastic fluctuations in this difference induce
more noticeable correlations (Figure 5A).
Perceptual persistence
In intermitted displays, the persistence of a percept across the
stimulation gap is often measured in terms of a ‘survival
probability’ Ps [23], viz. the probability of the same percept
dominating before and after the gap. Our model predicts an
interesting and complex dependence of Ps on stimulus duration
Ton and blank duration Toff, which is illustrated in Figure 6A.
For short Ton, the MP s do not charge and the survival
probability Ps is influenced only by differential activity in the EPs,
which decays rapidly after stimulus termination. For this reason,
Ps decreases rapidly with increasing Toff (Figure 6A, red curve).
When Ton is long enough to charge MP s, but too short to permit
spontaneous reversals, Ps is governed by memory and remains
close to unity as long as the memory persists (Figure 6A, purple
and blue curves). Finally, when Ton is long enough to permit
spontaneous reversals, the memory activity of both percepts is
Figure 5. Sequential correlations for continuous and intermit-
tent displays. A: Correlation coefficient cn between dominance
periods i and izn, as a function of n and normalized to c0. B: Effect
of differential stimulus intensity of continuous display. Correlation
coefficient c1 and STdomT of both percepts, computed for different
values of nRight
? . Data are from the same simulations as in Figure 3B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000430.g005
Two Levels Bistable Perception Model
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(Figure 6A, green curve).
Some of these predictions are borne out by published evidence.
For example, Leopold and colleagues reported uniformly high Ps
for intermediate values of Ton (400 ms; [23]). For longer Ton that
permitted spontaneous reversals, survival probability Ps progres-
sively decreased.
When Ton permits two dominance periods, survival probability
Ps reflects the relative durations [23,32,33]: Psw0:5 when the most
recent period lasted longer than the less recent period and Psv0:5
when the situation was reversed. Our model readily accounts for
these observations (Figure 6B), provided Toff is sufficiently large.
The regime of Toffv1s [34,52,53], where fast adaptation could
become important, is again out of the scope of our model.
Discussion
We propose that binocular rivalry, and other instances of
bistable perception, reflect the stochastic integration of many
meta-stable populations at two levels of neural representation, viz.
sensory input and perceptual experience. While previous accounts
of bistable perception rely on an oscillatory dynamic, our model is
inherently stochastic. We argue that a fluctuation-driven process
accounts naturally for key characteristics of bistable perception
that have remained puzzling for decades.
One of these puzzling characteristics is the wide range of
average times between perceptual reversals, which for different
observers, display types, and stimulus properties can extend over
two orders of magnitude [30,31]. Another unexplained finding is
the preserved stochasticy of reversals, that is, the fact that the
statistical distribution of times between reversals is Gamma-like
and exhibits a shape parameter r with typical values from 3 to 6.
Taken together, these observations strongly suggest a fluctua-
tion-driven escape process. In such a process, the system state
fluctuates until it reaches an escape threshold, at which point it is
reset some distance away from threshold. Depending on the
asymptotic value of the integration process, the average frequency
of threshold crossings can vary over more than one order of
magnitude, while the distribution of times between threshold
crossings will retain its Gamma-like shape. This uncoupling of
mean dominance time and shape parameter is an important
advance over previous models and is illustrated in Figure 3B.
Following this general insight, we model bistable perception as a
‘race’ between two independent processes of stochastic integration,
each concerning multiple neuronal pools that are individually
meta-stable between inactive and active states. We further assume
an escape threshold and a competitive reset mechanism that resets
each process whenever the other process reaches threshold.
Previous models of bistable perception postulate a deterministic
process at the level of individual neurons (i.e., spike-frequency
adaptation [32,34,35,54] or synaptic depression [44–46]) which
drives the system towards a reversal threshold. The resulting
oscillatory dynamic is typically perturbed by a suitable level of
neural noise [17,35,47–49]. In such an ‘oscillator model’, the
average time between reversals is set by thedeterministic process
while the statistical distribution of these times directly reflects the
level of noise. For a given set of parameters, oscillator models such
as [32,35] produce either a realistic, Gamma-like distribution of
dominance times or a realistic dependence of mean dominance
times on stimulus properties (e.g., intensity or timing), but not both.
For example, an oscillator model such as [35] accounts for the
dependence of dominance times on stimulus times only in the
absence of noise. When the model is imbued with realistic levels of
noise (so that r~6), the dependence on stimulus intensity all but
disappears.
Yet another puzzling characteristic of bistable perception is the
hysteresis or memory effects that become evident when visual
presentation is interrupted [23,24]. To summarize the available
evidence, the history of percepts prior to an interruption biases
perception once stimulation resumes. Memory effects are long-
lasting and are characterized by time-scales an order of magnitude
larger than those of perceptual reversals [23,33]. Memory effects
are stabilizing in that they favor the recurrence of percepts that
have dominated already in the past. Not only the most recent
percept, but also less recent percepts that have dominated longer,
leave a measurable bias [23,32,33]. Finally, the stabilizing
influence of perceptual history is evident not only in the percept
that dominates a renewed stimulus onset but also in the duration
of dominance phases following that onset [55].
To account for memory effects, several oscillator models have
been extended to include an additional interaction or state
variable [32,34,35]. However, none of these models captures the
entire range of experimental findings. The model of Noest and
Figure 6. Survival probability Ps and perceptual history. A: Joint
dependence on Ton and Toff, see text for details. B: When Ton contains
two dominance phases of durations T1 and T2, Ps decreases with T1
(less recent phase) and increases with T2~Ton{T1 (more recent
phase).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000430.g006
Two Levels Bistable Perception Model
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 7 July 2009 | Volume 5 | Issue 7 | e1000430colleagues [34] lacks a second, longer time-scale and does not
account for observations with long interruptions of stimulation.
The models of Wilson [35] and of Brascamp and colleagues [32]
include multiple time-scales and do capture long-lasting memory
effects. However, the Wilson model [35] does not account for the
influence of the duration of dominance phases preceding the
stimulus interruption [23,32,33]. Conversely, the model of
Brascamp and colleagues [32] fails to predict the observed effect
on dominance durations following the stimulus interruption [55].
Our stochastic-integration model incorporates two time-scales
in the form of ‘evidence populations’ (EPs with higher transition
rates) and ‘memory populations’ ( MP s with lower rates). A
material difference to other models [32,35] is that EPs are driven
by sensory evidence and perceptual state, while MP s are driven
only by perceptual state. This ensures that the memory of a
perceptual state builds up while this state persists and correctly
predicts all effects of and on dominance duration that have been
reported so far [23,32,33,55]. The recurrent influence of
perceptual state on both MP s and EPs distinguishes our model
from other two-level models [45,50], which employ a strictly
feedforward architecture.
With one major exception (see below), our model comprehen-
sively predicts the dynamics of bistable perception for continuous
and intermittent displays. For example, it predicts dominance
times, dominance distribution shape, sequential correlations
between dominance times, and perceptual persistence across
blank periods, including, in the case of intermittent displays, the
dependence of these quantities on Ton and Toff. Some of the
predictions bear out past experimental observations: the degree to
which phenomenal experience is stabilized with different values of
Ton and Toff in an intermittent display [22–24], or the
dependence of phenomenal experience on a history comprising
several preceding dominance periods [23,32,33]. Several other
predictions of interest are yet to be tested, however. For example,
our model predicts how the shape of the dominance distribution
(Figure 4) and the size of sequential correlations (Figure 5) should
vary with Ton and Toff under conditions of intermittent
presentation.
An important test for models of bistable perception are the
opposite and unequal changes in dominance time that results from
an asymmetric changes in stimulus intensity (‘‘Levelt’s second
proposition’’) [5]. Our model correctly predicts the unequal
dependence of dominance times on the intensity of a weaker
stimulus and partially predicts the reversed dependence of
dominance times on the intensity of a stronger stimulus [17].
In its current form, our model does not account for the well-
known effects of visual adaptation [39,56–60] on bistable
perception. This omission is intentional and is meant to highlight
the dynamic possibilities offered by stochastic integration on the
longer time-scales at which adaptation effects are expected to be
small. The absence of adaptation implies that our model cannot
account for the phenomenon of ‘‘flash suppression’’ [61,62] and,
more generally, for the perceptual effects of brief stimulus
interruptions (,1000 ms) [22,34,52,53].
For the sake of simplicity, our model is formulated in terms of
abstract, meta-stable populations governed by transition proba-
bilities. The underlying idea is that each population represents a
recurrently connected network of spiking neurons, with two
metastable attractor states [63–67]. In such a ‘working-memory-
type’ network, stochastic transitions between attractor states are
driven by internally generated fluctuations in network activity
[49,65,68–71]. The transition probabilities nz and n{ are the
escape rates from the two attractor states: the lower the attraction
force, the higher the escape rate. Importantly, the transition rates
depend less on the time-constants of individual neurons than on
the average activity level and the amplitude of activity fluctuations
in relation to the transition threshold. This is why small differences
in recurrent connectivity can shift transition rates by some orders
of magnitude [68–70].
Our model postulates that perceptual dominance reflects a
collective decision on the basis of two distributed representations
(viz., two pools of meta-stable populations). The stochastic
integration of those representations provides the accumulated
information for the perceptual decision; such a mechanism has
been also proposed as a substrate for the perception of time
[71,72]. In a detailed (spiking network) model, such a collective
decision would require convergent synaptic projections to a
readout stage, where competitive interactions could ensure that
any decision is categorical [73,74]. In other words, our model
predicts the existence of a competitive stage receiving projections
from all evidence and memory populations. This hypothetical
stage would somewhat resemble the ‘‘saliency map’’ that has been
postulated by some authors [75,76].
Finally, excitatory and inhibitory projections between represen-
tational (evidence and memory populations) and readout levels
could generate the facilitatory and suppressive interactions that are
needed to start the stochastic integration process over and over
again. Such competitive- cooperative interactions in a multi-level
network have been studied in the context of visual attention
modeling [77].
In conclusion, we suggest that bistable perception is a
fluctuation-driven process and is best understood in terms of a
progressive integration of, and a collective competition between,
‘working-memory-type’ populations at multiple neural levels.
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